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This thesis covers the interplay and possible conflicts between EU competition law and data privacy regulation in relation to big 
data containing users’ personal data that companies possess. The research questions concern whether dominant companies can 
be forced to grant access to their data sets to their competitors. The thesis will then analyze whether as a result of granting such 
access, companies could violate the applicable privacy regulations by sharing their users’ personal data without adequate consent 
from them. 
 
According to EU competition law, there has to be an abuse of a dominant position for the prohibitions of EU competition law to 
apply. This thesis will first seek to define whether big data can amount to an essential facility and as a result become a tool for 
abuse. The answer to the above question depends largely on the nature and uses of the particular data set. Another factor having 
relevance is the market structure and possible entry barriers present.  
 
The thesis will then provide an overview of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (‘’GDPR’’), which provides for rules 
concerning the processing of personal data of individuals. Under the GDPR, once personal data has been collected, it can only be 
used for the purpose it was collected for unless consent is provided by the data subject. Furthermore the GDPR places emphasis 
on information duties to the individuals whose data is being processed.  
 
As a result there is legal uncertainty for companies that face requests from competitors for access to their data. Furthermore it 
might not prove to be simple task for the regulators and courts to assess when access to data truly is necessary and on what terms 
such access should be granted and monitored.  
 
The conclusion is that data can under certain circumstances amount to an essential facility, without which other companies cannot 
survive on the markets. This is however a case specific issue and cannot be assumed automatically. Imposing access too readily 
risks reducing the incentives for the companies to invest in big data.  
 
On the other hand when granting access to a competitor, the provisions of the GDPR should be complied with. The situation is not 
satisfactory and there is considerable legal uncertainty for companies facing requests to share their data sets containing personal 
data. The thesis recommends that sector specific regulation might be the answer to these concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The increasing significance of big data and its implications for competition  
 
The term big data has become a widely used term in the past years. Big data can broadly be 
said to encompass large amounts of different types of data that is produced with high velocity 
and originates from a vast number of different types of sources. This vast mass of data is 
then processed with the help of powerful processors, software and algorithms.1 
 
The significance of big data lies in the word ‘big’. Indeed big data has quickly become one 
of the most important economic asset that a company can have and it has the potential to 
create significant competitive advantage for companies and increase innovation and growth. 
The benefits of big data include the development of new data-based goods and services, 
improvement in production, marketing through targeted advertisements and decision-mak-
ing and enhanced research and development.2  
 
With such huge competitive advantage for companies controlling such data sets, the question 
arises whether the collection and exploitation of data can raise entry barriers for companies 
entering the market and not having such assets at their disposal.3 The barriers can be of 
technological, legal, or behavioral in nature.4 Some entry barriers are unique to big data, 
such as the need to be able to store and analyze large volumes of data.5 Especially in con-
sumer social networking platforms, the collection of big data through free-access services 
funded by advertising can potentially raise competition concerns.6 However, the point is not 
to say that possession of large data sets in itself is an issue that the competition law should 
interfere. Instead it must be asked whether a data set is replicable or not. Furthermore, the 
ability of a company to process and utilize data is more crucial than the sheer volume of 
data.7 Even EU’s Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has in her speech noted 
                                                          
1 Communication from the Commission (2014), p. 4. 
2  OECD (2013), p. 319.  
3 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016), p. 11.  
4 Rubinfeld – Gal (2017), p. 369.  
5 Ibid, p. 348. 
6 Marini-Balestra – Tremolada (2017), pp. 342-343. 
7 Ibid, p. 343.  
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that companies need to ensure that they don't use data in a manner that stops other companies 
from competing.8  
 
How does competition law then regulate these types of situations? First of all the main aim 
of the EU competition law is the protection of the process of competition. More specifically, 
competition law is concerned in companies harming consumer welfare for instance by re-
ducing input, reduce quality and innovation.9 One particular form of a harmful practice by a 
dominant company behaves in anticompetitive manner towards its competitors.10 The EU 
competition law only intervenes in behavior of dominant companies in relation to such con-
duct. This begs the question of whether a company could be held dominant under the EU 
competition law through controlling big data.  
 
A company is dominant where it enjoys a position of economic strength making it possible 
for it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave in manner that is to an appreciable extent independent of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers.11 There are various factors to consider in defining 
the dominance of company such as the relevant market shares,12 constraints caused by the 
actual competitors, constraints caused by the credible threat of potential competitors’ entry 
into the market and those resulting from countervailing buyer power.13 It is often argued that 
big data is ubiquitous, cheap to acquire and available on a wide scale.14 However, this might 
not be the case always as the organization, storage, and analysis of big data matter in addition 
to the mere control of such data.15 The report conducted by the French and German Compe-
tition Authorities (‘’Franco-German report’’) states that there are arguments towards the col-
lection and exploitation of data as raising entry barriers and being a source of market 
power.16 
 
                                                          
8 Speech of Vestager, Margrethe (2016).  
9 Whish (2008), p.1. 
10 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 
11 Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978. United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v 
Commission of the European Communities. Case 27/76, EU:C:1978:22. Para. 65. 
12 Geradin – Layne-Farrar – Petit (2012), p. 189.  
13 Communication from the Commission (2009), para. 12.  
14 Stucke – Grunes (2016), p. 42. 
15 Cowen (2016), p. 16. 
16 Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016), p. 11.  
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Once it is established that a company is dominant, it cannot in general refuse to supply its 
competitors its essential facilities or else it risks infringing EU competition law.17 The es-
sential facilities doctrine makes it possible for the competitors of a dominant company to 
gain access to the essential facility of the dominant company when the facility is indispen-
sable and certain other requirements are met.18 This thesis will refer to the access by com-
petitors as ‘forced access’.  
 
However in relation forced access it must be borne in mind that many data sets in fact contain 
information of individuals (customers and users of the products of the companies). The EU 
General Data Protection Regulation19 (‘’GDPR’’) provides for rules concerning the pro-
cessing of personal data of individuals. According to the GDPR, personal data encompasses 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier, which can 
be for instance the person’s name, an identification number, location data, an online identi-
fier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural or social identity of that person.20 The GDPR provides for various safeguards 
for personal data. For instance it should be transparent to people that their personal data are 
processed and to what extent the personal data are processed. Especially the information on 
the identity of the party who actually processes the personal data (‘processor’) and the pur-
poses of the processing must be communicated to the person.21 
 
As a result, dominant companies holding big data that containing personal data face diffi-
culties in complying with both competition law and the GDPR when facing requests from 
competitors to share their big data, which can lessen legal certainty.  
 
While both competition law and the GDPR are EU level legislation, they do have different 
background and purposes. For competition law the main principles are fairness, economic 
                                                          
17 Case No 94/19/EC Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink - Interim measures, Decision of 21 December 1993. 
Para. 66. 
18 Judgment of the Court of 26 November 1998. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- 
und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG and others. Case C-7/97, EU:C:1998:569. Para. 41. For the innova-
tive product requirement see judgment of the Court of First Instance (Grand Chamber) 17 September 2007. 
Microsoft Corp v. the Commission. Case T-201/04, EU:T:2007:289. Para. 632. 
19 Regulation 2016/679. 
20 Article 4 of the GDPR. 
21 Recital 39 of the GDPR. 
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welfare, market integration, and protection of consumers and the freedom to compete.22  The 
ECJ has held23 that the protection of the interests of competitors or of consumers is not the 
only interest protected by the EU treaty but also the structure of the market and competition 
as such. Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘’TFEU’’)24 does not 
only to practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to practices which 
are detrimental to consumers through their impact on competition.25 On the other hand the 
goals of data privacy rules are to protect privacy through the use of informational self-deter-
mination whereas the goal of competition law is to ensure and enable an efficient and func-
tioning competition in the markets.26 According to the Finnish Data Ombudsman, the pur-
pose of data privacy regulation is to secure the protection of privacy and other fundamental 
rights as well as building and maintaining trust while at the same time offering proper pre-
requisites for the processing of data.27 However, some commentators have argued that com-
petition and data privacy share common objectives which are to protect fairness, ensuring 
freedom and choice and preventing harm. 
  
There seems to be no clear stand so far on whether the EU competition law should take into 
consideration data privacy related matters as is demonstrated in the case of Asnef-Equifax28, 
where the ECJ held that issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a 
matter for competition law but that of data protection regulation.29 However some scholars 
are of the view that the EU competition law should take into consideration data protection 
issues. For instance Meriani argues that data protection issues cannot be excluded from con-
sideration under competition law despite its different goals whenever the data protection 
issues can have an effect on the competition law.30 Indeed there have been other comments 
at the EU level supporting the need to consider privacy related matters in relation to compe-
tition law as Margrethe Vestager has in her speech noted that companies need to ensure that 
                                                          
22 Lianos (2013), p. 13.  
23Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) 6 October 2009. GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited et al. v Com-
mission. Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C‑519/06 P, EU:C:2009:610. Para 63.  
24 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Consolidated version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Official Journal C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390. 
25 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) 14 October 2010. Deutsche Telekom AG v the Commission. Case 
C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603. Para. 176.  
26 Warma – Nieminen (2016), p. 569.  
27 The Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman (2015). 
28 Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) 23 November 2006. Asnef-Equifax et al. v. Asociación de Usu-
arios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc). Case C-238/05, EU:C:2006:734.  
29 Ibid, para. 63.  
30 Meriani (2017), p. 93.  
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they don't use data to prevent other companies from competing. However, she went on to 
emphasize that there is not a problem just because a company hold a large amount of data 
since the point of big data is that it has to be big.31  
 
This thesis will focus on competition law but will also seek to include relevant data privacy 
rules where appropriate. By doing this, it will be demonstrated that there is a potential for a 
conflict between the application of these two areas of law. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The object of this thesis is to analyze the issues raised by the accumulation of big data to 
companies and the possible implications from the point of view of competition law. The 
particular emphasis being on the doctrine of essential facilities found in the competition law 
under which a dominant company’s facility can be made subject to a forced access by com-
petitors.32 The aim is to provide answers to the following questions: 
 
1. Can the accumulation of big data to a dominant company result in such data assets 
being held as an essential facility under the EU competition law? 
 
2. What are the possible issues and concerns arising from forced sharing of data assets 
containing personal information of users? 
 
3. How should the forced sharing of data assets containing personal data be regulated 
to ensure that the possible concerns are dealt with properly? 
 
1.3 Methodological and structural remarks 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the current state of EU competition law. Certain aspects of the 
GDPR are also analyzed in relation to the possible data privacy related issues arising from 
the sharing of big data containing personal data. The topic of the thesis is multisided in the 
sense that the research questions are located in the intersection of competition law and data 
                                                          
31 Speech of Vestager, Margrethe (2016). 
32 See for instance Oscar Bronner (supra note 18). 
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privacy law, although the main focus in on competition law. For these purposes, the primary 
research method is the legal dogmatic method.  
 
The Legal dogmatic method has as its aim the study of the current existing legal system and 
state of law. The dogmatic method both interprets and systemizes the norms.  In addition to 
the analysis of legal rules, this method can also be used to study the legal principles as a 
norm contains both rules and principles. This is evident in this thesis as both the current state 
of the competition law and data privacy rules contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union and the GDPR will be discussed in addition to the legal praxis of the 
courts. The dogmatic approach also encompasses the weighing of the legal principles, which 
requires that the principles are interpreted. This thesis will embark on the weighing of legal 
principles of competition law and data privacy and will use interpretation of the existing 
norms as a means to achieve this goal.33  
 
The dogmatic method is not a pure description of law as it also contains statements on how 
the laws should be interpreted and systemized.34 This approach also introduces an element 
of de lege ferenda research. As a result this thesis seeks to provide recommendations on the 
possible ways to solve the collision between forced sharing of big data and the data privacy 
rules.  
 
Finally there are some elements of comparative methodology at times due to the fact that 
competition law and data privacy law are EU level legislation. However, only a light version 
of a comparative method is used. For instance there are some instances where it is necessary 
and informative to analyze a case from a Member State court in order to understand the 
larger legal framework.  
 
1.4 Scope of the research 
 
This thesis seeks to address the question of how the EU competition law governs the situa-
tions where companies gain possession of large data sets known also as big data. Accord-
ingly, the main area of law of the thesis is competition law but the intersection of data privacy 
                                                          
33 Hirvonen (2011), pp. 21-25.  
34 Ibid, p. 25.  
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regulation and competition law will also be discussed. The main issue is whether the com-
petition law doctrine of essential facilities, where dominant companies can be forced to allow 
competitors access to their facility, is compatible with the GDPR, which provides for the 
protection of personal data. For the purposes of the thesis it is assumed that the data sets in 
question contains personal data although this is not the case always (for instance purely nu-
merical data). Furthermore, the term personal data in this thesis is understood in the same 
sense as in the GDPR.35 This thesis will consider situations where the company possessing 
the data set is in fact dominant under the EU competition law rules although in reality this is 
not always the case and could be the subject of a separate research.  
 
Furthermore, there are various legal protections available for the owners of databases in the 
EU such as those provided in the Database Directive.36 These forms of protection will be 
discussed briefly, but are not the main focus of this thesis.  
 
As for the jurisdictional remarks, the thesis will primarily focus on the EU level competition 
law case law and Commission decisions with some jurisprudence of the EU Member State 
courts also analysed where appropriate for the sake of providing useful examples on the 
matters discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Article 4 of the GDPR provides that personal data means any information relating to an identified or identi-
fiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, 
an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. 
36 Directive 96/9/EC. 
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2. Big data  
 
2.1 Characteristic of big data 
 
This thesis will closely relate to big data and its implication to companies conducting busi-
ness in the markets. Big data plays a huge role in today’s society and the growth of big data 
technology and services were expected to be USD 16.9 billion in 2015 with an annual growth 
rate of 40%.37. Companies receive big data from a variety of sources such as when people 
upload messages and photos over social media or their phones transmit their locations.38  
 
There is no single definition for big data. One definition of big data is that it means large 
amounts of different types of data that is produced with high velocity from a large number 
of various types of sources and requires tools and methods such as powerful processors, 
software and algorithms.39 Big data encompasses datasets which have a size that cannot be 
captured stored, managed or analyzed by typical database software tools.40  
 
Rubinfeld and Gal say that the volume of data refers to the exponentially increased amount 
of data that can be collected and analyzed. They describe volume as the main characteristics 
of big data. The term velocity refers to the speed of change, which plays a crucial part in 
dynamic markets. The term variety refers to the number of different sources for the collection 
of data. Veracity concerns the accuracy of the data. The metadata that is the result of the 
synthesis can be included in the definition of big data in addition to the data collected.41 
 
It is important to realize that companies do not always collect big data by themselves. Ac-
cording to Lerner, data brokers are firms that collect consumer data from many sources both 
online and offline by e.g. using tracking technologies on certain websites (for instance cook-
ies) and they provide various services to their clients involving the sale of such collected 
data.42 
 
                                                          
37 Communication from the Commission (2014), p. 2. 
38 Executive Office of the President (2016), p. 5.  
39 Communication from the Commission (2014), p. 4. 
40 McKinsey Global Institute (2004), p. 1.  
41 Rubinfeld – Gal (2017), pp. 345-347.  
42 Lerner (2014), pp. 8-9.  
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2.2 The definition of data and the legal framework surrounding data 
 
There are various ways to define the meaning of data. One way is to separate data into per-
sonal and non-personal data, however this type of definition fails to define the exact border-
line between personal and non-personal involvement in the processing of data.  
 
One key concept in relation to data is that it is non-rivalrous. This means that if one person 
uses such a good, it can also be used by other persons.43 While it is relatively easy to see the 
benefits of big data for companies, society and individuals, it is also necessary to analyze 
the types of legal protection offered for data in order to understand how companies might 
seek to protect their valuable asset. It is first however necessary to consider can information 
as an intangible good even be owned.  
 
In UsedSoft44 the ECJ held that where commercial transactions involve a transfer of the right 
of ownership of the copy of the computer program, a customer who downloads the copy of 
the program and concludes a user licence agreement relating to that copy receives a right to 
use that copy for an unlimited period.45 The ECJ held that the downloading on to the cus-
tomer’s server of a copy of the computer program on the rightholder’s website and the con-
clusion of a user licence agreement for that copy were a sale.46  According to Abrahamson 
the UsedSoft decision implies that intangible goods such as software downloaded via the 
internet could be subject to a specific ownership.47  
 
If one assumes that information can indeed be subject to ownership, it is then possible to 
consider the various ways to protect this data. Ursic and Custers argue that among the various 
IPRs, copyrights, database rights and trade secrets most closely concern data. For instance, 
copyright protects the expression or form of a piece of work but not the idea or concept. 
Hoeren points out that while databases enjoy legal protection under the EU database di-
rective in situations where they have been created as a result of investing substantial amount 
of time and money, this protection does not extend to the underlying data.48 
                                                          
43 Duch-Brown – Martens (2017), p. 12.  
44 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 3 July 2012. UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. Case 
C‑128/11, EU:C:2012:407.  
45 Ibid, para. 45.  
46 Ibid, para. 84. 
47 Hoeren (2014), p. 753. 
48 Ibid, p. 752. 
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The Database directive provides for two forms of legal protection for databases. The first 
form is the protection by copyright and applies to databases which as a result of the selection 
or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation. The sec-
ond form of protection is based on a sui generis right and applies to databases in cases of 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively substantial investments made in either the obtaining, ver-
ification or presentation of the contents of the database.49  The owner of a protected database 
can stop certain acts by others such as reproduction or re-use of the database.50  
 
The Database directive states that51 for the purposes of said directive, database means a col-
lection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical 
way and individually accessible by electronic or other means. Prima facie this definition 
includes the types of data sets discussed in this thesis. However, the Database directive only 
applies to databases which as a result of the selection or arrangement of their contents, con-
stitute the author's own intellectual creation and the protection afforded by the Database 
directive does not extend to the contents of the database.52 There are limitations to the pro-
tection of a database under the Database directive. In relation to the sui generis protection, 
the ECJ53 has held that the expression 'investment in ... the obtaining ... of the contents' of a 
database in the Database directive refers to the resources used to locate materials that exist 
and collect them in the database. Resources used for the creation of materials contained in 
the database are not included in that definition. As a result, the protection is rather limited 
under the database protection and in any case does not amount to nearly all forms of data 
collection. 
 
Datasets can also be protected as trade secrets. However, trade secret protection does not 
extend to information that public or obtained through legitimate means such as discovery or 
creation.54 Ghosh points out that privacy and security restrictions may offer protection for 
                                                          
49 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) 15 January 2015. Ryanair Ltd v PR Aviation BV. Case C‑30/14, 
EU:C:2015:10, at para. 34.  
50 European Commission, Commission launches public consultation on Database Directive. Available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-launches-public-consultation-database-di-
rective> (accessed 15 March 2018). 
51 Article 1 of the Database Directive. 
52 Article 3 of the Database Directive.  
53 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 November 2004. Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus Ab. 
Case C-46/02, EU:C:2004:694. Para. 49. 
54 Graef (2015), p. 81.  
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personal and other sensitive types of data. He also says that commercially valuable infor-
mation is often protected by the measures offered by trade secret law within a company and 
collection of data by database protection.55 
 
Currently there is no uniform legal instrument governing trade secrets in the EU level. How-
ever article 39 of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(‘’TRIPS’’) provides that information amounts to a trade secret where it is not generally 
known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with that 
kind of information, has commercial value due it being secret and has been subject to rea-
sonable steps to keep it secret. Cleary big data satisfies the criteria of not being generally 
known or accessible as well having commercial value, furthermore companies can keep their 
big data analytics and even data itself secret from other parties to some extent. Finally trade 
secret regulation seems to fit big data quite well since the TRIPS refers to information. How-
ever, once the data has been disclosed to a certain number of parties, it is no longer capable 
of enjoying protection as a trade secret. This in turn makes it quite challenging for companies 
to rely on trade secret protection for their big data as they would need to embark on quite 
burdensome process on keeping their data secret.  
 
There might be little economic interests to disclose big data for companies that do not sell it 
as a product, however additional reasons such as privacy regulations discourage companies 
from disclosing their data. Also big data might reveal information such as faults in the prod-
ucts or programmes of the company holding the big data.56  
 
As a result of the fact that there are no clear rules on the ownership of data sets,  it possible 
for parties to seek to become the de facto owners of the data by means of data collection and 
protection technology which are combined with their market power.57 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
55 Ghosh (2012), p. 202. 
56 Mattioli (2014), p. 549. 
57 Duch-Brown – Martens (2017), p. 18.  
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2.3 The benefits of big data 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘’OECD’’) 
big data is a core economic asset that has the potential to create significant competitive ad-
vantage for companies and drive innovation and growth. The benefits of big data include the 
development of new goods and services that are based on data, improved production pro-
cesses, improved marketing through targeted advertisements, improved decision-making 
and enhanced research and development.58 Big data leads to more informed decision-making 
which might enable companies to make more efficient decisions59. Rubinfeld and Gal are of 
the view that having access to data has become a valuable asset and create a competitive 
advantage.60 
 
It has been estimated that big data can result in 60% potential increase in retailers’ operating 
margins.61 Lerner says that online providers of services can use data to improve the quality 
of their services in many ways, for instance by reaching customers in a manner that is as 
efficient as possible.62 Businesses can gain from using big data as they can improve the ef-
ficiency of their production processes, forecast market trends, improve their decision-mak-
ing processes and enhance the segmentation of their customers.63  
 
Companies can utilize user data to improve the targeting of advertisements and sell this ser-
vice in order to obtain more money to spend on the quality of the service and attracting more 
users (‘monetisation feedback loop’). These loops can make it very difficult for a new com-
pany to compete with a company with a large customer base.64 After all it is marketing what 
most companies do to maintain their position and increase their profits. The Commission has 
in its Google/DoubleClick decision noted that online advertising is capable of reaching a 
more targeted audience in more effective manner as companies can  target the audience pre-
cisely by combining information concerning geographical location, timing, the customer’s 
areas of interest, the customer’s purchase history and search preferences.65 The Commission 
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further held that the merged entity would be able to combine DoubleClick's and Google's 
data collections and as a result match records from both databases. This could result in indi-
vidual users' search histories being linked to that user’s past behaviour on the internet, which 
could be used to better target advertisements.66  
 
Indeed big data could be used for private gains for companies67 and the fact that access to 
data is often not allowed for competitors, indicates the value of data for companies.68 How-
ever, arguing that big data only benefits companies would be a narrow approach as it leaves 
out innovation leading to improved quality and better targeted ads for consumers leading to 
a more informed consumer experience provided that the information is presented in a proper 
manner. In addition, the importance of big data is not limited to commercial purposes of 
large companies. Indeed big data can be the factor in improving areas such as medicine, 
climate food safety and other areas.69 
 
Big data does not only produce benefits to companies and society but also to consumers such 
as the use of so called free services, improvement of quality and increases in innovation. 
However, here lies a caveat, as the services are not truly free for the consumer as the con-
sumers give up their personal data to the companies.  
 
2.4 The significance of user data for companies 
 
Big data plays a big role in online services such as social media networks in the form of user 
information. According to Shelanski customer information can enable a company to improve 
its service offerings and as a result increase the returns. Customer data can also be a strategic 
asset that allows the company to maintain its position in the market and to curtail entry into 
the market. User information can also amount to a commodity, which the company sells to 
other companies.70 Even at the Commission level there has been acknowledgements con-
cerning the importance of social media as a source of data. Vice-President of the European 
Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes in her speech71 stated that: 
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‘’Many of the “free” services now used by billions on the Internet would not be possible 
without the income derived from the various forms of online advertising. Advertising reve-
nues – or at least the prospect of such revenues – are the basis of a wave of innovative 
services that are transforming our economy and society.’’ The Commission in Telefónica 
UK/ Vodafone UK/ Everything Everywhere/ JV72 noted that customers generally tend to give 
their personal data to many companies who collect and market it and as a result this type of 
data is generally seen as a commodity.73 The fact that consumer hand over their personal 
data for companies has various implications. For instance former Commission Vice-Presi-
dent for Competition Joaquin Almunia has said on June 30, 201474: ‘’As to data privacy, it 
is a fact that Google and other large digital players collect and keep unprecedented amounts 
of data, including personal data, which can be retrieved and used across their services. This 
is a legitimate cause for concern which, however, lies beyond the remit of competition pol-
icy.’’ The statements by the Commission clearly demonstrate that the significance of big 
data at least at conceptual level have been noticed by the EU regulator. The emphasis seems 
to be rather consumer oriented and the conduct of companies from the competition law sense 
has not been the focus in these arguments. This is understandable as the source of big data 
often are individuals giving their information online and this tends to shift the focus to the 
consumer level. 
 
It has not been clear under which area of law and by which authority should the privacy 
concerns arising from big data be handled. The ECJ has held that any possible issues relating 
to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law and may be 
handled in accordance with the data protection laws.75  The Commission analysed the pos-
sible concentration of data and whether it was likely to strengthen Facebook's position in the 
online advertising market or in any sub-segments. The Commission held that any privacy-
related concerns resulting from the increased concentration of data within the control of Fa-
cebook as a result of the transaction were not within the scope of the EU competition law 
rules but belong to the scope of the EU data protection rules.76 Grac-Aubert argues that the 
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Commission choose not to analyse the potential concentration of data which raises implica-
tion that the Commission does not have the competence to do so. The result is that the data 
protection authorities will be the competent authorities.77 However it is questionable whether 
any clear implications can be drawn from these statements as the issue as there have not been 
any consolidating legislation and technologies are rapidly developing leading to the need for 
the law to adapt to the changes.  
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3. Competition law 
 
3.1 Background of competition law  
 
Competition law is the branch of law that has as its goal the protection of the process of 
competition. Competition law is at its fundamental level concerned on the growing market 
power by companies which can harm consumer welfare for instance by reducing input, re-
duce quality and innovation.78  
 
One form of a harmful practice by a dominant company occurs when the company embarks 
in abusive behavior towards its competitors.79 The meaning of dominant position has been 
clarified in the case law of the ECJ and relates to a position of economic strength that an 
undertaking has which allows the company to prevent effective competition being main-
tained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent in-
dependently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.80 However, a 
dominant position is the result of a combination of several factors which separately are not 
necessarily determinative.81 Market shares in themselves are not solely determinative of 
dominance, however the longer time and the higher the share, the more credible is the dom-
inance of a company.82 Other factors such as the constraints from the actual competitors, 
constraints imposed by the credible threat of future expansion by actual competitors or entry 
by potential competitors and the countervailing buyer power have to also be taken into con-
sideration when assessing dominance.83  
 
The main source of EU competition law is TFEU, which contains various articles governing 
competition law in the EU. Article 102 TFEU concerns abuses by dominant undertakings. 
For any undertaking to violate article 102 TFEU, there must be a dominant position, an abuse 
of that dominant position and an effect on trade between Member States.84 The concept of 
abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant po-
sition which has an influence on the structure of a market where, as a result of the presence 
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of the undertaking, the degree of competition is weakened and which by using methods dif-
ferent from those which condition normal competition has the effect of impeding the mainte-
nance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that compe-
tition.85  
 
Article 102 of the TFEU contains the most important provision for the purposes of dominant 
companies, namely it provides that among others limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers or applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage 
amount to an abuse. It is quite obvious why limiting markets or technical development is 
prohibited from dominant companies, however the second form of abuse concerning ‘other 
trading parties’ requires elaboration. The answer to this question becomes clear when taking 
into consideration that in addition to practices which may cause damage to consumers di-
rectly, abuse can also occur when the practices are detrimental to consumers by impacting 
on the effective competition structure. Abuse may occur if an undertaking in a dominant 
position strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached sub-
stantially limits competition, i.e. that only undertakings remain in the market whose behav-
iour depends on the dominant one.86 It has been stated in many instances that dominant un-
dertakings have a special responsibility not to engage in conduct that can impair competi-
tion.87  
 
3.2 Anticompetitive concerns arising from big data  
 
In addition to the possible legal obstacles to sharing of data, companies can also embark on 
measures that hinder the reuse of data for competitors. Many commentators have argued that 
it is crucial for the purposes of data reuse for the recipient company to know where the data 
is coming from, how it has been collected and organized and manipulated. It goes without 
saying that if companies do not have at their disposal the necessary parameters to further 
process the data they receive from others, the data loses some or all of its usefulness.  
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Sokol and Comerford introduce an often stated example of anticompetitive situation is where 
companies cannot compete with larger companies as they lack similar volume of data and 
this in turn widens the quality gap between the dominant company and its smaller rivals. The 
larger firm in this situation has no incentives to engage in innovation or to maximize quality 
of its products. The OECD has noted that market concentration and dominance are favoured 
by the economics of data. The OECD points out that data-driven markets can lead to a “win-
ner takes all” situation where market success leads to concentration.88  
 
The situation is not made easier by the fact that many consumers do not even consider that 
they trade their information for services from companies. The European Data Protection Su-
pervisor has stated that the markets for personal information are far from being transparent, 
fair or efficient as the customers are generally not aware of the precise value of the personal 
data that they give to the companies in exchange for so called free services.89 According to 
one research, UK consumers increasingly see their personal data as an asset in data ex-
changes with organisations. According to the study, the proportion of consumers that hold 
such a mindset was 56% in 2017.90 As a result, large companies could invest more on ad-
vertisements and on making their services more attractive to gain new users for their services 
at the expense of smaller rivals.  
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4. Essential facilities 
 
4.1 The background of the essential facilities doctrine 
 
The right to choose the trading partners and freely to dispose of property are generally rec-
ognised principles in the Member States laws and incursion on those rights requires justifi-
cation.91 On the other hand, it is established legal praxis that companies cannot counter the 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct by arguing on the freedom to conduct business and 
the right to property as those principles are subject to public-interest restrictions.92 Kalimo 
and Majcher point out that a company with economic strength has a special responsibility to 
ensure that its conduct does not harm competition, but it’s still free to set fair and non-ex-
ploitative terms for the dealings.93 Often essential facilities cases have come up in relation 
to facilities that had the characteristics of a natural monopoly. It is difficult or economically 
wasteful to duplicate the facility due to high fixed costs and low marginal costs and that is 
why natural monopolies are existing.94  
 
Against this background it seems clear and reasonable that companies can be forced to share 
access to their facilities in some instances. The essential facilities doctrine is a more special-
ised form of the dominant company's duty to deal with its competitors. The classic case of 
essential facilities is a situation where a competitor wants to become a new customer of the 
dominant company and seeks access to a physical resource controlled by the dominant com-
pany by offering remuneration. The refusing dominant company may then be forced to share 
its infrastructural resources, networks or other facilities with a competitor which is unable 
to function in the market without such access.95  
 
The Commission has noted in its Guidelines, that the concept of refusal to supply covers a 
broad range of practices, such as when the dominant company refuses to supply products to 
existing or new customers, intellectual property rights related refusals to supply, or refusal 
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to grant access to an essential facility or a network.96 However, the essential facilities doc-
trine cannot be applicable to mere processes even if these production processes result in 
competitors’ activities uneconomic.97 O’Donoghue and Padilla prefer the interpretation that 
essential facilities concern ‘stage of production’ meaning something that is capable of being 
sold or licensed and resembles real market.98 
 
According to the Commission’s Guidelines, competition problems typically arise when the 
dominant undertaking and the buyer whom it refuses to supply compete on the downstream 
markets. The Commission defines the term ‘downstream market’ as the market for which 
the refused input is needed in order to manufacture a product or provide a service.99 This is 
not always the case with data intense markets as companies often need the data to develop 
their services and products. The companies’ products and services in these cases compete at 
the same level of the market. As a result, the conventional market analysis might not be the 
most suitable tool to assess the market for companies’ products that rely on big data.  
 
4.2 The requirements for the essential facilities doctrine 
 
One of the first cases of essential facilities in the EU was the Sea Containers v. Stena 
Sealink100, where the Commission held that where an undertaking has a dominant position 
in the provision of an essential facility and does not grant access to competitors (who cannot 
provide services to their customers without such facility), without objective justification or 
grants access to competitors only on terms less favourable than those which it gives its own 
services, infringes EU competition law.101 The Bronner102 case was about a nationwide 
home-delivery scheme consisting of delivering the newspapers directly to subscribers. Ea-
gles points out that the distribution system in Bronner case was in strict legal terms nothing 
more than a network of interlocking contracts and was not a form of property, intellectual or 
otherwise.103 This supports the argument that even data itself could be an essential facility if 
one considers whether data is capable of being an asset without which the competitors of a 
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dominant company could not conduct business. Waller and Tasch argue that in addition to 
traditional infrastructure, a variety of resources including certain software platforms, and the 
internet satisfy the criteria for essential facilities.104  
 
One of the most best known EU cases dealing with refusal to supply is the Magill case105, in 
which the court laid out the principle that in order for the refusal to be abusive. First of all, 
the refusal has to prevent the appearance of a new product, which the requesting party does 
not offer and for which there is a potential consumer demand. Second, there should be no 
justification for such refusal. These requirements have been developed in subsequent case 
law of the ECJ, which will be discussed below. It is interesting to compare the Magill criteria 
to the views of the Commission. The Commission considers the following criteria when 
determining whether an obligation to deal should be imposed on an undertaking: the refusal 
has to relate to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effec-
tively on a downstream market, the refusal is likely to cause the elimination of effective 
competition on the downstream market, and the refusal is likely to result in consumer 
harm.106 Both approaches emphasize the indispensability of the facility and consumer per-
spective. These criteria will be discussed in detail below. 
 
4.2.1 The indispensability requirement  
 
In the Bronner case the ECJ noted that it is necessary, not only that the refusal of the service 
bis likely to eliminate all competition in the relevant market of the party requesting the ser-
vice and that such refusal cannot be objectively justified, but also that the service in itself is 
indispensable to carrying on the requesting party's business, to the extent that there is no 
actual or potential substitute in existence for the required facility.107 The Bronner case con-
cerned the distribution system for newspapers and the ECJ noted that alternative methods of 
distributing daily newspapers, even though possibly less advantageous for the distribution 
of certain newspapers, exist and were used by the publishers of those daily newspapers.108 
The ECJ also pointed out that there were not any technical, legal or economic obstacles 
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making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher of daily news-
papers to establish, alone or with other publishers, its own nationwide home-delivery scheme 
and use it to distribute its own daily newspapers.109 Finally the ECJ noted that access can be 
only indispensable, if at the very least it can be established that it is not economically viable 
to create a second home delivery scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers providing 
the circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers distributed by the existing 
scheme.110   
 
O’Donoghue and Padilla point out that the question therefore is whether a company operat-
ing on the same scale as the dominant firm could develop its own facilities, not whether the 
requesting party can.111 It follows that the facility has to be crucial not only to requesting 
company’s activities but also for the larger and hence more competitive entrants. Eagles is 
of the opinion that this distinction recognizes in an implied manner that it is not the role of 
an economically rational competition law to encourage inefficient entry or assist companies 
simply because they are small.112 Stothers points out that there are views that in markets 
where the parties do not sell products or services directly to the consumer, some stricter 
analysis should be applied than the one considered in the Bronner case.113 This would be an 
important factor in order to avoid free riding from companies that only use data as a raw 
material to improve their services and enhance their own data.  
 
Advocate General Jacobs was of the opinion in the Bronner case that the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine is justifiable only in cases in which the dominant company has a 
position on the market amounting to a genuine stranglehold. This could happen for instance 
where duplication of the facility is impossible or extremely difficult due to physical, geo-
graphical or legal constraints or is highly undesirable for reasons of public policy. Further-
more, it is not sufficient that the control of a facility gives the undertaking a competitive 
advantage.114 For the cost of duplicating the facility alone to amount to a barrier to entry, the 
cost must be at such a level as to prevent any prudent undertaking from entering the mar-
ket.115  
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Graef argues that in Microsoft, the Court lowered the indispensability standard by conclud-
ing that in order to be able to compete viably, competitors should be able to interoperate with 
the Windows domain architecture at an equal level with the Microsoft systems.116  He com-
pares this judgment to the Bronner case, where it was held that it is not decisive whether the 
product that is demanded is the most advantageous possibility, as long as there are alterna-
tives which are economically viable for competitors.117  He concludes that according to the 
Microsoft judgment, as long as the alternatives do not put the competitor at an equal level, 
the product amounts to an indispensable product.118  
 
In order for the indispensability requirement to be satisfied, there should be no effective 
substitutes available.119 However, as has been noted in relation to the nature of data, there 
are very few situations in which data is not available from another source than from the 
company refusing access as data is often non-rivalrous. It might prove to be challenging 
however to analyze what other sources of data are sufficiently similar to be effective substi-
tutes, but this does not in my opinion change the fact that the substitutability of data is in 
general quite feasible. 
 
4.2.2 The new product requirement 
 
According to the Commission, it is not necessary that without the refused input, no compet-
itor could ever enter or survive on the downstream market. Rather, an input is indispensable 
where there is no actual or potential substitute on downstream competitors can rely so as to 
counter at least in the long-term the negative consequences arising from the refusal. The 
Commission will in these instances make an assessment of whether it is possible and feasible 
for competitors to effectively duplicate the input of the dominant undertaking in the foresee-
able future.120 
 
When the requested facility is instead an intellectual property right, the focus turns on the 
nature of the requesting party’s own product and on the potential consumer demand of such 
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a product. This is demonstrated in the IMS case121, where it was held that the refusal by a 
dominant undertaking to allow access to an indispensable product protected by an intellec-
tual property right may be regarded as abusive only where the requesting undertaking does 
not  limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the sec-
ondary market by the owner of the intellectual property right, but intends to produce new 
goods or services that are not offered by the right owner and for which there is a potential 
consumer demand.122 Ezrachi and Maggiolino see this problematic as by stripping IMS of 
its main asset, the Court challenged not only the alleged abuse, but also the dominant position 
of IMS itself.123 
 
The Commission and the ECJ in the case of Microsoft extended the requirement for a new 
product to that of follow-on innovation. The Commission went beyond a mere analysis of 
the ‘new product’ criterion as defined in IMS Health and concluded that Microsoft’s refusal 
was a ‘refusal to allow follow-on innovation’, in other words, the development of new prod-
ucts, and not a mere refusal to allow copying.124 The General Court held that the circum-
stance relating to the appearance of a new product, as envisaged in Magill and IMS Health, 
cannot be the only parameter which determines whether a refusal to license an intellectual 
property right is capable of causing prejudice to consumers and that such prejudice may arise 
where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical develop-
ment.125 
 
Ezrachi and Maggiolino argue that in the Microsoft case, the Court used Article 102(b) of 
the TFEU to expand the Magill criteria by adding innovation into it and thus lowered the 
threshold for refusals to license to be abusive. This development has introduced legal uncer-
tainty.126 Ezrachi and Maggiolino also argue that in Microsoft, the CFI introduced the idea 
of economic indispensability by holding that although access to the market might have been 
technically possible, Microsoft's refusal to license the interoperability information elimi-
nated the economic viability of any entry into the market.127 
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4.2.3 The elimination of competition requirement 
 
One question arising in relation to the requirements of essential facilities is whether compe-
tition has to be eliminated immediately or is it sufficient that there is a threat of such an 
elimination. The Commission and the ECJ in the Microsoft case clarified that there is no 
need to establish that competition has already been eliminated or, at least, that its elimination 
is imminent.128 According to the Commission, the likelihood of effective competition being 
eliminated is affected by factors such as the size of the market share of the dominant under-
taking in the downstream market. The likelihood of effective competition being eliminated 
is in general increased when the market share of the dominant undertaking in the downstream 
market grows. The less capacity-constraints the dominant undertaking faces compared to 
competitors in the downstream market, the closer the substitutability between the dominant 
undertaking's output and that of its competitors in the downstream market, the greater the 
proportion of competitors in the downstream market that are affected, and the more likely 
the demand that could be served by the foreclosed competitors would be diverted away from 
these competitors to the benefit of the dominant company.129 In relation to big data, there 
are unlikely to be capacity constraints as data is a non-tangible good, however it is difficult 
to say what level of substitutability each data set has and what the likelihood is that the 
demand could be diverted from foreclosed competitors to the dominant company. 
 
4.3 Potential justifications for refusal to supply 
 
The duty to deal is not automatically imposed on an undertaking even in situations where 
the above requirements of the essential facility doctrine are met as the Commission will look 
into whether from consumer perspective, the likely negative consequences of the refusal to 
supply are greater over time compared to the negative consequences of imposing an obliga-
tion to supply.130 According to the Commission, a refusal to supply might be necessary to 
allow the dominant undertaking to receive an adequate return on the investments made in 
order to develop its business, thus creating incentives to continue to invest in the future, 
while acknowledging the risk that projects do not always succeed. The dominant undertaking 
is free to assert that its own innovation will be negatively affected by the obligation to supply, 
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or by the structural changes in the market conditions that imposing such an obligation will 
bring about, including the development of follow-on innovation by competitors.131 However 
the dominant undertaking has to demonstrate any negative impact which an obligation to 
supply is likely to have on its innovation. If a dominant undertaking has supplied the input 
to the companies before, this can be relevant for the assessment of any efficiency based 
justification claims.132 
 
The Commission will consider the possible claims made by the dominant undertaking that 
said undertaking’s conduct is justified in the way that the conduct is objectively necessary 
or that the conduct produces substantial efficiencies which outweigh the anticompetitive ef-
fects produced on consumers. The Commission will assess whether the conduct is indispen-
sable and proportionate to the dominant undertaking’s claimed goal.133 According to the 
Commission, factors outside of the dominant undertaking are used to determine the question 
of whether the conduct is objectively necessary and proportionate.134 However, even tech-
nical and commercial reasons can be taken into consideration.135  
 
In order to succeed in justifying its refusal to supply the Commission states that the dominant 
undertaking has to show that four cumulative conditions are fulfilled.136 First, the efficien-
cies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct (for example improved 
quality of goods, or a reduction in the cost of production or distribution of the goods). It is 
not enough that there is an increase in the total wealth of the society, but the benefits arising 
from the increased efficiencies have to be received by the consumers and not remain at the 
company’s disposal.137 Second, the conduct has to be indispensable in order to acquire the 
efficiencies so that there must be no less anti-competitive alternatives to the conduct capable 
of producing the same efficiencies. Third, the likely efficiencies resulting from the conduct 
have to outweigh any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the 
markets affected. Finally, the conduct should not result in total elimination of effective com-
petition. According to the Commission, exclusionary conduct which maintains, creates or 
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strengthens a market position and is close to a monopoly cannot be justified in normal cases 
by arguing that it also creates efficiency gains.138  
 
Applying the above Commission’s criteria to refusals to supply data to competitors demon-
strates the complexity of the issue. The dominant company must be able demonstrate that its 
conduct is done in order contribute to improve the production or distribution of products or 
to promote technical or economic progress.139 The dominant company has the burden to raise 
any plea of objective justification.140 It might prove quite challenging for companies to 
demonstrate just how the refusal to share data might achieve these requirements.  
 
The company would have to demonstrate efficiencies resulting from such a refusal. Efficien-
cies on the contrary seem to be more readily realized when more companies have access to 
data that enables them to produce better products and services. The second requirement is 
the indispensability to achieve the alleged efficiencies requirement which is for the dominant 
company to demonstrate. Therefore, the dominant company must be able to demonstrate 
why alternatives for the conduct would be significantly less efficient.141 It is hard to see how 
the refusal could be indispensable to realizing such efficiencies for the company as the com-
pany is still able to keep the data to itself and keep analyzing it further due to its non-rivalrous 
nature. Finally the balancing act between the efficiencies and negative effects could prove 
to be very challenging.  
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5. Big data and the essential facilities doctrine 
 
5.1 Data as an essential facility 
 
Companies can have strong incentives to engage in certain conduct in order to maintain their 
competitive advantage in relation to data such as limiting other companies’ access to data, 
preventing the sharing of the data, and opposing data-portability policies.142 Ursic and Cus-
ters are of the view that liability under Article 102 TFEU appears to be most likely in situa-
tions where a party seeking access needs the user data as an input for a new product that 
would not be in direct competition with the main product of the online platform provider’s.143 
Even at the regulatory level, there have been concerns over the use of personal data to facil-
itate the infringement of competition law. Vice President of the European Commission re-
sponsible for Competition Policy, Joaquín Almunia has said144 that: ‘’the commercial value 
of personal data has grown exponentially. In spite of this, DG Competition has yet to handle 
a case in which personal data were used to breach EU competition law. But we cannot rule 
out this eventuality. In time, personal data may well become a competition issue; for in-
stance, if customers were prevented from switching from a company to another because they 
cannot carry their data along.’’ 
 
Having considered the nature of data and the prerequisites for the essential facilities doctrine, 
it is possible to embark on an analysis on some of the cases that have dealt with refusal to 
grant access to data by companies.  
 
In the English case of Attheraces145, the court was of the opinion that pre-race data held by 
the party responsible for the administration of British racing, was essential to the business 
of a party who used the information to maintain his services. There was no substitute for the 
information with the administrator being the only supplier of said data in the market. It would 
have been prohibitively expensive and difficult and rather impractical for any other person 
to process and supply the same data.146  The court held that the control of the pre-race data 
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was an essential facility and that the refusal to supply the data amounted to an abuse of 
dominance.147 Interestingly the judge in the case was of the opinion that it did not matter 
whether the parties are in competition or potential competition for an unreasonable refusal 
to supply to amount to an abuse of a dominant position within Article 102 TFEU.148 Accord-
ing to the Court, the effect may be for example to deter the market entry of other companies, 
or to encourage the purchaser to exit the market, or to limit the purchaser’s activities within 
the market.149 
 
The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court has ruled on a case concerning abuse of domi-
nance in relation to data. The case was an appeal by Suomen Numeropalvelu Oy (‘’Numer-
opalvelu’’) after the Market Court had ruled that Numeropalvelu had abused its dominant 
position by refusing to give certain information to Eniro Finland Ab (‘’Eniro’’) on the 
grounds that due to data privacy laws, the service providers are not allowed to offer their 
services for free and without registration on the internet to end users.150 Numeropalvelu had 
terminated its contract with Eniro and notified Enrio that it would no longer update Eniro’s 
electronic database used for search.151 According to the then Finnish Competition Authority, 
Numeropalvelu had breached Finnish competition law by refusing to conduct business with-
out adequate reason and had applied unreasonable terms.152 The market could held that Nu-
meropalvelu’s claimed justification for refusal based on data privacy laws was not adequate. 
Numeropalvelu argued that the subscribers should have been informed about the use of the 
contact details in Eniro’s service or that consent should have been acquired, however ac-
cording to Market Court, this was not a factor to be taken into consideration in these types 
of situations.153  
 
These cases demonstrate how national courts have been able to recognize situations in which 
data sets can amount to essential facilities and furthermore have been able to consider 
whether the refusal to deal amounts to an abuse. The Numeropalvelu case demonstrates how 
the collision between the essential facilities doctrine and data privacy have been dealt with 
by the Court, although in that case the Court choose to disregard the data privacy concerns 
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as a valid argument for the refusal to share the data. However, this is a case decided before 
the GDPR and furthermore is at the national level. As a result no conclusions should be 
drawn from it concerning the collision of data privacy and competition law.   
 
5.2 Characteristics of big data that support the application of the essential facility doc-
trine   
 
Stucke and Grunes argue that if big data was truly ubiquitous, low cost and widely available 
as often claimed, then companies would not waste money and time by offering ‘’free’’ ser-
vices in order to gain the personal data of their users.154 The Franco-German competition 
report notes that the collection and the ways in which data are used could be a factor that 
raises entry barriers and be a source of market power.155 In relation to data, the barriers can 
be technological, legal, or behavioral with often the combination of both.  However, there 
are barriers that are not unique to data such as barriers arising from two-sided markets or 
network economies.156  
 
Rubinfeld and Gal argue that certain entry barriers are unique to big data, such as storage of 
large volumes of data. Furthermore, the specific characteristics of the data necessary for a 
particular market in which the data serve as an input can have an influence on the intensity 
and type of entry barriers.157 
 
The non-rivalrous nature of big data basically means that technology wise it can be easily 
and cheaply copied and shared for instance by selling and licensing their data sets to multiple 
users. However with big data one must keep in mind that not only its collection is relevant, 
but also the organization, storage, and analysis which can be said to transform data into a 
private good.158 Despite the fact that data is said to be non-rivalrous, whether one data set is 
necessary for all companies to operate will depend on whether it is a replicable or non-rep-
licable asset. This depends how the particular data is used and why it is processed.159 Even 
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if particular data set can be copied, this does not mean it will remain as valuable.160 Further-
more, the value of data for companies relates more to the need to be able to understand the 
changing customer needs instead of using historical past data.161 Big data requires the ca-
pacity to analyse largely unstructured data sets from diverse sources which is only possible 
by linking data sets. This type of data is highly context-dependent and may be of no value 
outside the exact context. Some estimations state that the amount of unstructured data in 
businesses could amount to 80% to 85% of the amount of data.162 
 
Rubinfeld and Gal have identified three types of barriers to entry at the stage of collection 
of big data. The first one is that of technological barriers, which refer to situations, where 
data cannot be easily replicated. This might be the case if the data were created as a result of 
a distinctive interaction. Another barrier relates to the point in time that a certain company 
has started gathering data. Finally, the whole system for data collection may also create tech-
nological entry barriers.163 Rubinfeld and Gal argue that a barrier related to technological 
supply-side can arise where companies have achieved substantial economies of scale or 
scope through investments which are partially or wholly sunk. Therefore, where economies 
of scope are large, this might create entry barriers to companies that have access to merely 
one source of data.164 
 
According to the Franco-German competition report, due to the sheer size of an incumbent’s 
data set, it might not be possible for competitors to simply buy the data from a third party. 
This is especially so where the incumbent has a large customer base and offers free services 
to consumers who generate large number of data.165 The Franco-German competition report 
states that the collection of data could result in entry barriers in cases where entrants cannot 
collect the data or buy the same kind of data when it comes to the volume and variety of the 
data.166 Even the Commission has noted in the Google/DoubleClick decision that competi-
tion based on the quality of collected data does not simply depend on the size of the database, 
but also depends on the variety of data that competitors have access to and whether it will 
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be useful for conducting internet advertising.167 The Franco-German competition report 
states that the non-rivalrous nature of data does not mean that all companies have access to 
data or able to collect data on an equal footing. These issues should be dealt on a case-by-
case analysis.168 
 
Stucke and Grunes argue that the authorities and courts will not be focusing on important 
entry barriers, namely network effects, if they focus on traditional entry barriers in relation 
to data.169 Free entry of companies to the market might not decrease the market power of an 
incumbent company where there are consumer switching costs and learning costs resulting 
in changing to the competitors’ products.170  Sokol & Comerford explain that network effects 
are present in online platforms meaning that a service becomes more valuable to its user 
when more people use the same service. Indirect network effects refer to uses not being in 
direct contact with each other.171 Sokol & Comerford are of the opinion that users may switch 
companies simply due to an innovative product regardless of the existence of network effect 
enjoyed by the larger company.172  
 
However this statement might be too bold as even innovative products require marketing 
and economies of scale thus placing larger companies at an advantage.  Rubinfeld and Gal 
argue that network effects can create a barrier to entry in the context of data, where the 
quality of the product is influenced by the quality of the data and the quality of the data is in 
its turn influenced by the number of data entries, their variety, and how up to date they are.173 
The Franco-German competition report notes that smaller competitors may be marginalized 
due to data access becoming differentiated as the larger amount of data a company has, the 
more it can support its services and attract more customers and data. The company holding 
large amounts of data can afford even better data analytics tools and by using them, attract 
even more customers.174 The loss of users will likely result in the decrease in the quality of 
the company’s products and result in less people using the products.175  
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The Franco-German competition report points out that even in so called free services, con-
sumers might not necessarily multi-home that readily as switching costs can prevent con-
sumers from using various providers in equal proportions especially where the quality is the 
only parameter for competition.176 The Franco-German competition report points out that 
multi-homing by consumers and diversification of services by a company might not be that 
simple as access to data might depend on the capacity of the company to build a customer 
base that is sufficiently large. This depends on the presence of network and experience ef-
fects and economies of scale as entry barriers.177  
 
Another factor to consider are industries where data is used to deliver a personalized expe-
rience for the user, and plays an important role in customer experience. In such industries, 
there might be few substitutes for big data.178  
 
The intensity of the barrier to entry also depends on the consumers' switching costs. How-
ever, two-sided markets do not necessarily mean that entry barriers are high. The switching 
costs and lock in effects manifest themselves in the investment of time needed for the con-
sumer to learn to use a platform, the number of complementary products available to the 
consumer, or the fact that the consumer’s friends use the same platform.179 Koponen and 
Mangiaracina argue that if customers are locked in and it is not possible for them to make 
use of other service offerings, or their ability to do this is reduced significantly, competitors 
may be foreclosed. As a result the control of personal data is a way of excluding rivals.180  
As already discussed, consumers can give their personal data to many companies simultane-
ously, however the incentive to do this might be diminished if the consumer simply cannot 
change to another service provider due to technical or contractual obstacles.  
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5.2.1 The uses of data  
 
The Finnish Competition and Consumer authority has noted that even if data bases were 
public, the established companies might have at their disposal advanced analytical tech-
niques or a reputation as a trusted company causing new entrants to be marginalized. In 
situations where the data are not public, the established actors in the market can have a sig-
nificant advantage in the market rendering it difficult, costly and time consuming to meet 
the offers made by the incumbents.181  Rubinfeld and Gal argue that the value of data itself 
is often low and only becomes valuable through analysis that alters unstructured pieces of 
data into information and derived information i.e. creating new information that cannot be 
acquired from data directly. This data-based information allows companies to embark on 
product improvement and to better target consumers as well as to have an improved 
knowledge of different parties among other things. Data-based information can also benefit 
individuals enabling them to enjoy better products for instance.182  
 
Cowen criticizes the part of the Commission’s decision in Facebook/Whatsapp merger, 
where it referred to the generic collection of data and took no account of the unique nature 
of user data held by WhatsApp on its users.  He argues that if the alternative sources of raw 
data do not create same or similar knowledge then the accumulation of knowledge than that 
the combined entity cannot be replicated.  According to Cowen the Commission probably 
failed to consider that data about one consumer preference collected by one company in one 
situation is not much use as a substitute for data concerning something else collected by 
another company. Cowen argues that the competition authorities have not properly consid-
ered the situation in which datasets of companies form unique collections of data making 
them unique as a result, and whether they can be competitive advantages.183 The Commis-
sion has in TomTom/Tele Atlas184 analyzed the degree of demand-side substitutability be-
tween digital map databases for navigation purposes and for non-navigation purposes and 
held that the substitutability is limited, because the quality requirements differ very much in 
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detail, accuracy and level of update as well as in the amount of attributes and add-on lay-
ers.185 This is an ample example of how the Commission is able to analyze the different 
levels of substitutability of data, even though this case was a merger decision.  
 
5.2.2 The freshness of data  
 
As has been discussed already, data is most useful when it is fresh. Therefore information 
on past behavior is not sufficient and even if companies purchase data from data providers, 
the companies with established user base enjoy advantages over such companies.186  Marg-
rethe Vestager has in her speech said that it might not be easy to build a strong market posi-
tion by utilizing data that goes out of date quickly. She pointed out that it is important to 
analyze the type of data to see whether it stays valuable. Vestager also pointed out that is 
necessary to look at what are the reasons that hinder companies from collecting the same 
data from their own customers than another company is already doing.187  However, as dis-
cussed previously, it may not be the collection of the data, as much as the capability of a 
company to extract useful information in a timely manner from a large volume and variety 
of data resulting in a competitive advantage.188  
 
5.2.3 The economic costs of creating data assets 
 
The economics aspect also plays its part in the analysis as potential entrants do not constrain 
the dominant companies in markets with high fixed sunk costs such as requiring high and 
risky investment before entry.189 The Franco-German report notes that the costs of collection 
of data can be significant for instance in the form of fixed costs in setting up data centres. 
Furthermore a new entrant would have to set up platform that can provide services that ena-
ble the collection of data from a sufficiently large number of users that also increase the 
quality of the service. It might be challenging for companies to convince the customers to 
give their personal data.190 If a company has the capability to further process the data and 
maintain its utility, then such dataset might prove to be a larger barrier for new entrants. 
Despite the general view that data itself is non-rivalrous, the Franco-German competition 
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report notes that there might be limits on the possibility to access data. Furthermore, the 
Franco-German competition report points out that the scope of data that data brokers can sell 
to a company could be limited both in volume and in variety.191  
 
5.3 Characteristics of big data that do not support the application of the essential facil-
ities doctrine 
 
This part of the essay will analyze the arguments against big data being a barrier to entry for 
competitors. It will largely draw on the nature of big data as discussed earlier. The nature of 
data plays a crucial part in analyzing the possible competitive constraints that can relate to 
data.  From the point of view of competition law it should be noted that being big is not as 
such an offence under competition law.192  Even if a large company has a large set of data at 
its possession this does not at least prima facie lead to competition concerns, especially 
where competitors can collect this data somehow themselves.193  
 
While it is relatively easy to perceive that infrastructures such as transport, communication 
or energy facility networks are not feasible to duplicate,194 data itself is not a tangible good 
meaning that, once recorded, it can be re-used many times without loss of fidelity.195 It is 
obviously non-feasible to duplicate infrastructures such as transport, communication or en-
ergy facility networks.196 However in contrast to physical structures mentioned above, data 
itself is intangible. Lerner argues that the claims that competitors can be foreclosed through 
the collection of user data are based on assumptions that user data is an essential input, large 
amounts of such data are needed to compete efficiently and that large companies foreclose 
smaller competitors from access to this data.  However, online providers in reality do not 
have actual exclusivity over user data and its nature is non-rivalrous meaning that websites 
are free to collect the same data from a same user for same types of activities. In relation to 
user data, there are usually no exclusive contracts with users preventing them from parting 
their personal details or user data to competitors, no loyalty discounts that lock users into 
certain platforms.197 Kennedy argues that the possession of data can be compared to the 
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situation where a company builds an expensive factory before it sells a single product or 
collects a large amount of workers. In these situations the factory or the workers are not 
barriers to entry as such. Furthermore collecting data is relatively cheap.198  
 
The Commission has considered the nature of data in various merger decisions in the past. 
Margrete Vestager pointed out that the Commission has looked at similar issues in Google's 
acquisition of DoubleClick and Facebook's purchase of WhatsApp. The Commission did not 
see any concerns in these mergers as post mergers, other companies would have access to 
many sources of useful data.199 The Franco-German competition report is of the view that 
the Commission in the Google/DoubleClick decision took into account the possibility for 
competitors to access similar data as the merged entity.200 Furthermore the amount of avail-
able data could increase due to the presence of data brokers and the nature of digital markets 
where data collection is particularly common.201   
 
After these preliminary points on the nature of data and its relation to the essential facilities 
doctrine this thesis will move on to discuss and analyze whether the requirements of the 
essential facilities doctrine are satisfied in relation to big data.  
 
5.3.1 Indispensability  
 
As has been discussed above, one of the core requirements for the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine is the indispensability of the facility meaning that the service in itself has 
to be indispensable to for the business in the way that there is no actual or potential substitute 
available for it.202 Lambrecht and Catherine E. Tucker argue that widely available free open 
source technologies allows companies to analyze large datasets and consumers leave traces 
of their information to the internet increasingly thus making it possible for companies to 
obtain useful data for business purposes.203 
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The Commission has in some merger decisions analyzed the indispensability related nature 
of data. For instance in the Facebook/Whatsapp merger, the Commission held that the use 
of one consumer communications app does not exclude the use of apps made by competitors 
by the same user.204 Furthermore the Commission stated that users of consumer communi-
cations apps are not locked-in to any particular physical network, hardware solution or any-
thing else requiring replacement if one wishes to chance the service provider.205  According 
to the Commission regardless of whether the merged entity would use WhatsApp user data 
for the purpose of targeted advertising on Facebook's social network, there will remain a 
large amount of Internet user data that Facebook does not have exclusive control over.206 
While these arguments seem quite well justified, it is still necessary to point out that they 
concern specific case and specific market, but the Commission will likely consider these 
factors in other similar cases as well. As has been mentioned earlier, data is often simply an 
input for other products rather than being a product of its own. As a result, entry barriers 
should be analyzed beyond the specific market to cover the related parts forming the data-
value chain.207  
 
In relation to markets that utilize user data, it has to be emphasized that consumers often 
multihome, meaning that they use various service providers and share their data to different 
parties instead of just one company. Multihoming is a factor that reduces the market power 
of companies.208  The Commission held in Facebook/Whatsapp209 that consumer communi-
cations applications are a sector that develops rapidly and is characterized by low switching 
costs and barriers to entry/expansion. Furthermore leading market positions even if sup-
ported by network effects could be challenged by competitors and there had been entry by 
new players. The threat from new companies is a significant disciplining factor for the 
merged entity, no matter how large its network is.210  
 
In Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV211, the Commission concluded 
that the joint venture could collect a wide range of consumer information in the possible sub-
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markets, but that there were other strong and established competitors that could also offer 
comparable solutions. The Commission held as a result that other providers of advertising 
services would not be foreclosed from an essential input.212 The Commission held there were 
no entry barriers due to the facts of the case, but the analysis confirmed that personal data 
could be used for anticompetitive means in order to exclude rivals from the market.213 The 
Franco-German competition report notes in relation to essential facilities that the require-
ments of essential facilities are only satisfied where the incumbent’s data is truly unique and 
that there is no possibility for the competitor to have possession of the data it needs to per-
form its services.214   
 
5.3.2 New product  
 
As has been discussed in relation to the requirements of the essential facilities doctrine 
above, the refusal by a dominant company to license its data to its competitor should prevent 
the development of new products or follow-on innovation. In relation to data driven markets, 
it is relatively easy to conclude that companies can through the use of big data innovate and 
develop new products and services. For instance, in the online environment market players 
do not merely compete by lower prices and improved products but also by introducing new 
products and services affecting consumer demand.215 There are various industries that use 
large data sets to improve operations, for instance communications firms and gaming indus-
tries.216  
 
One situation where the new product requirement is unlikely to be satisfied is where a com-
petitor seeks to gain access to the dominant company’s data set simply to target its own 
customers with more efficient advertisement or to draw more new customers. These activi-
ties are not in any way innovative and are a form of free-riding. This raises the issue of how 
the regulators and courts can truly differentiate claims for access from genuine innovative 
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motivations and free riding as it is possible that a company attempts to hide its true inten-
tions. Therefore the new product or innovation should be assessed with utmost care and 
should not be assumed too readily.  
 
O’Donoghue and Padilla argue that a sensible approach would be to have the party request-
ing access to the facility to provide its plans on new product, the product should actually be 
a new kind of product for which there exists a consumer demand and which meets the needs 
of consumers in ways the old product did not.217 This would arguably place the burden on 
the party seeking access to competitors’ data set to demonstrate how this access would sup-
port in the creation of a new product or follow-on innovation. As a result groundless claims 
for access can be recognized and dealt with early on. 
 
5.4 Concluding remarks on whether data can be held to amount to an essential facility 
 
Big data could amount to an essential facility in very limited circumstances. Such circum-
stances are present when in order to function in a market, a company would have to have a 
data mass so wide and large that no alternatives to it are available.218 
 
The Franco-German competition report points out that the ECJ has in Bronner, IMS Health 
and Microsoft limited the applicability and scope of the essential facility doctrine. Basically 
an undertaking can request access to a facility or where the dominant company refuses to 
grant access to a product which is indispensable for carrying on the business, if as a result 
of the refusal, the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer de-
mand is prevented (this condition being applicable to intellectual property rights), if it is not 
justified by objective considerations and if it is likely to exclude all competition in the sec-
ondary market. Furthermore, in Bronner, the ECJ ruled that a product  is  indispensable  only  
if  there  are  no  alternative  products  and there are technical, legal or economic obstacles 
that make it impossible or unreasonably difficult for any company wanting to operate on the 
downstream market to develop, possibly in cooperation with other companies, products or 
services. These requirements will only be satisfied if it is demonstrated that the data owned 
by the dominant company is truly unique and that there is no possibility for the competitor 
to obtain the data that it needs to perform its services. An important point is that a more 
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liberal data access regime may also lessen incentives for competitors to develop their own 
sources of data. Finally, forced access to data may raise privacy concerns as forced sharing 
of user data could violate privacy laws if companies exchange data without their consumers’ 
consent.219 The privacy concerns arising from the forced sharing of data will be discussed 
below. 
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6. Application of the essential facilities doctrine in relation to big data 
 
6.1 Forced sharing of data as a remedy under competition law and the GDPR 
 
As has been described above, under certain circumstances, a dominant company can be 
forced to share its facility with a competitor. The remedy of forced sharing is however not 
the only type of remedy under competition law. Indeed the Commission has the power to 
impose a fine of up to 10% of the company’s total turnover under certain conditions.220 The 
EU data privacy laws do not contain structural remedies in comparison to EU competition 
law.221 This is understandable as structural remedies do not as such play such a role in the 
processing of data by companies as opposed to the role they play in regulating how compa-
nies conduct business and compete. Stucke and Grunes say that despite the fact that fines 
available under both EU competition law and GDPR, competition law remedies are superior 
to data privacy remedies in controlling monopolies.222 It is true that forced sharing of a data 
set is more efficient remedy than fining a company as the company could simply pay the 
fine and continue to refuse access. The GDRP provides for a different solution for the sharing 
of data between companies in the form of data portability contained in article 20 of the 
GDPR. According to this article, the data subject has the right to receive his personal data in 
a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit 
that data to another controller if certain conditions are satisfied (these will be discussed be-
low).  
 
The remedy that competition law provides in the form of forced sharing of data has implica-
tions on the data privacy of the users whose personal data is being transferred from the dom-
inant company to another company. On the other hand the concept of data portability is 
essentially designed to strengthen the control of the data subject over his or her own data223 
and not to maintain or improve the competitive situation. The implications of forced sharing 
and data portability will be discussed in the next part. The company subject to a forced shar-
ing remedy could in theory invoke certain measures in order to avoid sharing the personal 
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data of its users. According to the ECJ224, the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate 
interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations arising from Community 
law, including the fundamental freedoms contained in the Treaty. Therefore in principle a 
company could argue that the refusal to share its data would be justified by the fundamental 
freedoms of the citizens in relation to the protection of their privacy contained in various EU 
legal instruments. For instance under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.225 As 
has been stated earlier in this thesis, the purpose of data privacy regulation is to secure the 
protection of privacy and other fundamental rights and therefore a company could in theory 
base its refusal to share data containing personal data based on this fundamental right of 
protection of privacy. Even the data portability right is not absolute as the GDPR provides 
that the data subject has the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one 
controller to another, where technically feasible.226 Therefore the technical limits could re-
lease the company from providing the data portability. The various aspects of both forms of 
data sharing will be discussed next.  
 
6.2 Administrative problems of forced sharing of data under competition law 
 
The remedy of forced sharing requires some form of intervention by the courts in the form 
of a judgment as otherwise the parties would have simply reached an agreement on the shar-
ing of the data and no court intervention would have been required. Administrability prob-
lems concern the management of the access.227 It has been argued that courts are able to 
administer access to data more easily than access to physical facilities.228 Antitrust remedies 
in the form of essential facilities usually require the court to engage in supervision as simply 
forcing the monopolist to share the facility might not suffice in terms of for instance ensuring 
reasonable access price.229   
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One particular difficulty surrounding the forced sharing of data is that there is no single way 
to define the access terms for data. The OECD for instance has concluded that when it comes 
to the value of personal data, there is no single, perfect measure for it.230 Abrahamson points 
out that critics of the essential facilities doctrine argue that the courts are not necessarily 
capable of identifying and remedying refusals to deal.231 Abrahamson points out that the 
costs of sharing the data are likely near zero and as a result there is no need for judicial 
inquiry into the special characteristics of the industry or exact estimations necessary to de-
termine the costs of sharing.232 Piraino argues that the courts could make a rather general 
order stating that the monopolist make available its essential facility in a nondiscriminatory 
manner to its competitors instead of specifying the precise terms of access.233  
 
Choi argues that competition authorities do not have the necessary information and expertise 
to determine the optimal level of the access price especially due to the changing environment 
of dynamic industries.  According to Choi, the application of essential facilities doctrine for 
promoting ex post static efficiency has the negative consequence of decreasing ex ante in-
vestment incentives, which can lead to a serious loss of dynamic efficiency.234 As has been 
described earlier about the nature of data, there are considerable variations on the use of data 
and on the value of data for companies. In addition the exact nature of how the companies 
use data is context dependent and thus difficult for courts or administrators to define in terms 
of access remedies. It is completely different thing from the point of view of supervision and 
oversight to force a company to share its physical facility than its intangible data assets. 
Furthermore the access should in theory be continuous as due to the fast moving nature of 
data, historical data is of little significance. One could argue that in relation to physical in-
frastructure the access is also continuous as the competitor in normal cases would be granted 
access more than once. However the physical infrastructure remains the same unlike the data 
set that is continuously altered by the dominant company. Furthermore, is impossible to de-
fine the exact point when the data set is no longer the one that the court initially held to be 
essential for the other company. It is akin to saying that instead of a full cinematic piece, a 
company would only acquire one screen shot of the film. Big data just does not function that 
way in real life.  Thus there exist considerable obstacles to the administrability of the access 
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remedy rendering it questionable whether this type of remedy is suitable to deal with the 
possible issues arising from the accumulation of data by dominant companies.   
 
Finally forced sharing can decrease legal certainty since the limits of the essential facilities 
doctrine are not clear.235 Therefore at the level of legal rules, the doctrine of essential facili-
ties introduces legal uncertainty for companies utilizing big data in their operation. Further-
more even at the level of the remedy itself, namely forced sharing of the data, there are legal 
uncertainty related factors present. Hellstrom, Maier-Rigaud and Wenzel Bulst point out that 
a Commission decision has to be in accordance with the principle of legal certainty meaning 
that it must be clear and precise so that companies subject to such decisions know their rights 
and obligations and can act accordingly.236 The requirement that the decision to impose a 
duty to share access to data has to be clear and precise can turn out to be difficult to attain 
as the nature of big data itself imposes challenges on making precise definitions on the nature 
of the data and how access should be provided.  
 
6.3 Harmful effects on innovation from forced sharing of data  
 
In addition to the practical difficulties arising from forced sharing of data, there are also 
possible concerns arising in the form of decreased incentives for companies as there would 
be no reason for companies to invest in the big data asset in the first place if they were not 
allowed to benefit from their investment due to being forced to share this data set with a 
competitor. As a result companies might seek to use aggregated data and invest less on the 
data related analysis. Such a scenario will lead to consumers not benefiting from lower costs, 
new products and better quality.237 If competition law is to intervene on the process of a 
company choosing its trading partners, such an intervention requires careful consideration 
where the application of Article 102 would lead to the imposition of an obligation to supply 
on the dominant undertaking. The Commission has noted that the existence of such an obli-
gation may make it less desirable for the undertakings' to invest and innovate and, thereby, 
can cause consumer harm even if fair remuneration is offered to the dominant company.238 
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Arguably collecting and analyzing data sets requires costs and is time consuming and com-
panies’ incentives to embark on such procedures would be diminished if their data sets were 
subject to forced sharing.  
 
In certain specific cases, the Commission considers that it may be clear that imposing an 
obligation to supply is not capable of having negative effects on the dominant company’s 
incentives to invest and innovate upstream. This is particularly likely to be the case where a 
regulation already imposes an obligation to supply on the dominant undertaking and the 
necessary balancing of incentives has already been made by the public authority before im-
posing a duty to supply. This is also the case where the upstream market position of the 
dominant undertaking has been developed under the protection of special or exclusive rights 
or has been supported by the state financially.239 It is quite likely however, that companies 
that use big data in their business have not done so by the special protection of the state or 
similar circumstances. 
 
Furthermore, it is not universally accepted that forced sharing of a facility will automatically 
decrease incentives to invest and innovate. Ideally there should be some sort of a tradeoff 
between the ex-ante efficiency (the preservation of companies’ interests to invest) and ex-
post efficiency (after a company has innovated, all companies should have access to the 
innovation).240 Stothers is of the view that the argument that access to the product or service 
will reduce the future incentive to create essential facilities is highly misleading. He argues 
that access only stops the dominant undertaking from charging monopoly prices and so long 
as access is paid for at a competitive market rate, normal incentives exist to create the facil-
ity241. However, even a monopoly can result in less innovation as the company has less in-
centives to adopt the most efficient technologies.242 On the other hand effective competition 
will cause the inefficient firms to exit and allow the efficient ones to remain243. Therefore 
the most suitable level for innovations and productive efficiency might lie in the intermediate 
level of competition.244  
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This type of balancing exercise is demonstrated by the Commission’s Microsoft decision245, 
where the Commission embarked on a balancing exercise and held that the possible negative 
impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate was outweighed by the 
positive impact that the supply will have on the level of innovation for the entire industry in 
question.246 Ezrachi and Maggiolino argue that dominant undertaking not protected by net-
work effects face ongoing challenges caused by possible new entries and as a result are likely 
to engage in innovation in order to maintain their market position. However it is the percep-
tion of over-enforcement that might chill innovation.247 Sokol & Comerford say that smaller 
companies will maintain the incentive and ability to compete if smaller companies are well 
funded and have innovative products that cause consumers and advertisers to switch from 
larger companies.248 Smaller companies might even have larger incentives to invest in qual-
ity as they have more users to gain than the larger company with an existing large amount 
of users.249 Therefore the nature of the market is crucial factor and forced sharing might be 
more suitable where there are substantial entry barriers. 
 
The specific nature of data has to be taken into consideration here too. As Graef points out, 
the IT sector is not similar from other sectors in the economy as there exist very high entry 
barriers due to network effects, switching costs and economies of scale. According to Graef, 
due to the dynamic nature of the IT sector, compulsory licenses do not necessarily have a 
negative effect on innovation.250 However, big data is used in other sectors besides the IT 
sector and as a result it cannot be categorically stated that all markets in the sectors with big 
data have these features. 
 
Especially the fast moving nature of big data makes it difficult to justify why a company 
cannot simply continue collecting and analyzing data despite having to share its data set with 
a competitor if the company is capable of maintaining its user base by offering superior 
services. Again it is also crucial to note that the data itself is not the end product in these 
cases.  To take a more traditional example, a company operating train service on its train 
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tracks would find it difficult to argue that it would not have built the tracks if another com-
pany could use the tracks for it is the quality of the train service that the companies should 
be competing, not the infrastructure itself. On the other hand it is always possible to counter 
these arguments by saying that if data is so easy to obtain and analyze, then the smaller rivals 
could access this data by offering superior services themselves without having to obtain the 
data set from competitors. At least some form of free riding could possibly result in the 
forced sharing of data which is bound to have a negative influence on the overall attitude of 
market players. As a result the forced sharing of data is likely to raise at least some concerns 
over the incentives for the companies subject to such an obligation to innovate and invest. 
However, a case-by-case analysis is necessary before one concludes that this is the case. 
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7. The privacy implication arising from forced sharing of data 
 
7.1 The legal framework surrounding personal data in the EU  
 
This part of the thesis will focus on the privacy of personal data. The reason for this is that 
users’ data can and often does contain their person data. As has been discussed above, the 
dominant company could, under certain circumstances, be forced to share this data set under 
the essential facilities doctrine (in this case its data set comprising the personal data of its 
users) to its competitors. It is therefore necessary to consider how this is dealt with by the 
laws that govern data privacy at the EU level and what implications this might have on the 
sharing of these types of data sets. 
 
To begin with, the individuals whose data is being collected are often unaware of the pro-
cessing of their data as the collection of big data is based on so many different and sources 
which can be unexpected to them.251 Competition law involvement through forced sharing 
of the data can create privacy related concerns as the users in most cases have not consented 
to the sharing of their data to other parties and to the possible other uses made by those 
parties of the data.252 This means that the starting point on the sharing of user data between 
companies is problematic from the perspective of transparency as the users might not even 
realize that their data is shared.  
 
The EU adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (‘’GDPR’’) in 2016. The GDPR 
replaces the Data Protection Directive and its application will commence on the 25th of May 
2018.253 The GDPR acknowledges that the fast moving technological developments and 
globalisation have brought with them new challenges to data protection as the scale of the 
collection and sharing of personal data has been increased significantly by the technological 
development.  Furthermore people increasingly make personal information available pub-
licly.254 The GDPR has certain key principles such as the transparency principle according 
to which the processing of peoples’ personal data should be transparent. The principle of 
transparency requires information concerning the processing to be easily accessible and easy 
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to understand.255 It is particularly important to inform the data subject on the identity of the 
controller256 and the purposes of the processing of the data.257  Furthermore, data protection 
laws allow data subjects to enforce a remedy in courts and entitling them to compensation 
in cases of violations of privacy.258  
 
Data privacy laws are enforced at national level by the national authorities and at the EU 
level by the European Data Protection Supervisor (the “EDPS”). The EDPS is entitled to 
carry out investigations and can issue warnings or order that the controller complies with the 
requests of the data subjects concerning their rights under the data privacy, order the rectifi-
cation, blocking, erasure or destruction of data and impose a ban on processing of data.259 
 
The GDPR contains provisions on the lawfulness of processing of personal data. The most 
relevant provisions concerning the lawful basis of processing of personal data for the pur-
poses of this topic are:  
a) The data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for 
one or more specific purposes; 
b) the processing is necessary for the performance of a contract concerning the data 
subject; 
c) the processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the con-
troller is subject; 
d) the processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or 
of another natural person; 
e) the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; or 
f) the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the in-
terests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protec-
tion of personal data.260  
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The GDPR provides that the data has to be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes261. 
In addition to having a lawful basis on processing, companies must inform the data subject 
of the recipients of their data i.e. who will receive the data.262  
 
Based on the above considerations it is clear that the processing of personal data is heavily 
regulated in the EU under the GDPR and companies are not able to process data without 
having regard to the requirements of the GDPR. 
 
7.2 What type of data amounts to personal data 
 
Not all type of information qualifies as personal data and fall under the GDPR. According 
to the GDPR, personal data encompasses any information relating to an identified or identi-
fiable natural person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier 
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that natural person.263 This provision demonstrates how wide 
ranging the definition of personal data under the GDPR is.  
 
Even information such as an individual's search history is personal data if the individual to 
which it relates, is identifiable. Though IP addresses in most cases are not directly identifia-
ble through the use of search engines, identification is possible by a third party. Internet 
access providers have IP address related data at their possession. As a result, in most cases 
the data can be used to identify the user of the IP address.264 
 
It can be argued that the data sets of companies’ that contain user data will almost certainly 
contain personal data as defined under the provisions of the GDPR. As a result the GDPR is 
applicable to the processing of this data.  
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7.3 The lawful basis under the GDPR for the sharing of personal data contained in 
data sets under the essential facilities doctrine 
 
The objectives of competition law and data privacy do not always co-exist in harmony as 
Warma and Nieminen  point out that there could be a situation in which a dominant company 
violates either the data privacy laws by sharing its data containing personal data or compe-
tition law by refusing to share such data to a competitor.265 This part of the thesis will analyze 
whether the forced sharing of personal data contained in the data sets of a company is pos-
sible under the GDPR. For the purposes of this essay it is assumed that the recipient compa-
nies are private companies and will use the data sets containing personal data for business 
purposes. The purpose of this part of the thesis is to demonstrate that despite the fact that 
there is a court ordered remedy forcing the dominant company to share its data set to a com-
petitor, the GDPR will place additional requirements for the company to justify the pro-
cessing of personal data in the form of transferring said data to the competitor.  
 
a) The data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one 
or more specific purposes 
 
According to the GDPR, consent should be freely given. Furthermore in order for the consent 
to be informed, it is necessary that the data subject is being informed of certain aspects such 
as the controller’s identity and the purpose of each of the processing operations for which 
the consent of the data subject is being sought.266 These facts highlight the importance of 
informing the users on how their personal data will be processed and by whom. 
 
Taking into consideration the strict criteria for valid consent for processing of personal data, 
it seems unlikely that this basis is feasible for justifying the processing of the data subject’s 
personal information as the dominant company would have to acquire consent from all of 
the data subjects whose personal data it would transfer to its competitor. Furthermore due to 
the strict information requirements it is not possible to acquire the consent in advance for 
possible future purposes contained in the further processing by the recipient of the data.  
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b) The processing is necessary for the performance of a contract concerning the data sub-
ject 
 
A processor can rely on the lawful basis of contract where the processor has to process per-
sonal data in order to fulfil the processor’s contractual obligation to a person or where a 
person has asked the processor to complete a task before entering a contract. The processing 
should be necessary, meaning that there are no other ways to achieve the aims of the per-
son.267 This legal basis seems unlikely to apply to a situation where a company shares its 
data set to another company as it is difficult to see where a contract between the data subject 
and the dominant company would require the sharing of data based on the request of another 
company. As a result this basis is unlikely to be applicable for the present purposes.  
 
c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the control-
ler is subject 
 
The GDPR also contains a provision which allows processors to process personal data based 
on legal obligation to do so. Article 6(3) of the GDPR requires that the legal obligation must 
be laid down by national or EU law. The obligation does not have to be in the form of an 
explicit statutory obligation, as long as the application of the law is foreseeable to those 
individuals subject to it.268 The jurisprudence of the ECJ can form a sufficient legal basis 
too. There does not have to be an explicit legal provision providing for the activity, but the 
legal obligation has to have a sufficiently clear basis in either common law or statute. A court 
order requiring the processing of personal data for a particular purpose qualifies for legal 
obligation as well as regulatory requirements where there is a statutory basis for the regula-
tory regime and the organisations must comply with this obligation. One example of this 
could be a national authority having authority to remedy adverse effects on competition by 
way of forced disclosure of data.269 Furthermore in order to comply with a legal obligation, 
companies subject to such obligation can process personal data if it is necessary. For instance 
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where documents in the possession of the company have to be produced in response to a 
mandatory request for information or a court order.270 
 
The legal obligation basis relies on the regulator’s or court’s orders and is a more secure 
basis than legitimate interest which requires the balancing of interests. Furthermore the legal 
obligation basis seems applicable as even though there are no explicit provisions in the 
TFEU concerning the sharing of personal data in abuse of dominance situations, such an 
obligation can be inferred from art. 102 TFEU and through the case law of the ECJ concern-
ing essential facilities. What this basically means is that the legal basis to transfer the data to 
the competitor would be based on article 102 TFEU that lays down the basis for the sanc-
tioning of abuse of dominance. Furthermore Regulation 1/2003 contains the provisions for 
the structural remedies including forced sharing of facilities such as data. Finally the case 
law of the EU Courts and particularly the essential facilities doctrine form the legal basis for 
the transfer of the personal data in cases of forced sharing. However, this interpretation is 
quite broad as there is not a clear piece of legislation enabling companies to transfer data on 
the basis of a dominant position. Therefore whether the legal obligation basis is applicable 
depends on whether the regulators and courts adopt a broad or narrow interpretation of the 
meaning of legal basis in this context. Naturally it would be preferable for legal certainty if 
there would be more express legal provision for this sort of disclosure.  
 
d) The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or 
of another natural person 
 
The vital interest covers processing that is necessary to protect an interest which is essential 
for the life of the data subject or that of another natural person. Processing of personal data 
based on the vital interest of another natural person should in principle take place only where 
the processing cannot be manifestly based on another legal basis.271 This legal basis seems 
unlikely to apply to user data in relation to business purposes as the data for the purposes of 
commercial activities is unlikely to concern the vital interests of the data subjects.  
 
e) The processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public in-
terest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller 
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This basis will apply if the data is being processed in relation to either carrying out a specific 
task in the public interest which is laid down by law or in the exercise of official authority. 
The processing has to be necessary in the sense that the processing must be a targeted and 
proportionate way to achieve the aimed purpose.272 It is unlikely that companies using their 
users’ personal data in for business purposes could rely on this basis as they are private 
businesses instead of public authorities.  
 
f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of per-
sonal data 
 
Legitimate interests require that the personal data is used in ways that people would reason-
ably expect with minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the 
processing. Commercial interests of a company can be part of legitimate interest. The pro-
cessing must be necessary with no other less intrusive ways available. It is also possible to 
justify processing in the form of lawfully disclosing personal data to a third party. In this 
case the party disclosing the information should consider why the other party wants the in-
formation, does the other party actually need it, and what the other party will do with it. The 
disclosing party has to demonstrate that the disclosure is justified and the receiving party has 
to determine their lawful basis for their own processing.273 As a result the legitimate interest 
basis is applicable to processing even before a possible court decision to transfer the data 
has been made. However, in this case the dominant company transferring the data should be 
very cautious in balancing its own interests and the interests of the data subject.  
 
Conclusions on the legal basis for the processing of personal data  
 
The only feasible legal basis for the sharing of personal data seems to be limited to the legal 
obligation or the legitimate interest. However the problem with the legal obligation is that it 
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is uncertain whether there will be a broad enough interpretation by the regulators and courts 
should the processing come under question. For the basis of legitimate interest, the biggest 
obstacle lies in the fact that the interests of the data subject should be balanced against the 
interests of the dominant company and in particular it is questionable whether the data sub-
ject could have expected his or her data to be shared in such a manner when providing the 
data to the dominant company in the first place.  
 
As a conclusion on the lawful basis for processing it can be said that the GDPR does not 
automatically prohibit the disclosure of personal data to competitors, however the legal bases 
available are limited and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to ensure that 
the processing complies with the data privacy laws. In any case simply transferring a data 
set containing personal data to competitors following negotiations or a remedy imposed by 
a court would place the transferring company in risk of violating the GDPR and incurring a 
substantial fine274 as a result.   
 
7.4 Purpose limits to the reuse of personal data 
 
In addition to the legal bases for the processing of personal data described above, personal 
data can only be processed for new purposes if the controller asks for the data subject’s 
consent.275 The data reuse activities that might happen in the future can be described and 
communicated to the data subject before the collection of his personal or the data subject 
may be asked to renew his consent each time his personal data is used for a new purpose.276 
However, according to Ursic and Custers it may challenging to predict all the purposes for 
data reuse that may arise in the future and it may be nearly impossible to contact all data 
subjects and to secure their valid consent. The idea behind conveying adequate information 
to an individual is not only to comply with the fairness of processing but also enable the data 
subject to invoke his core rights such as right to access, erase and object.277 Stucke and 
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Grunes point out that consumers often are unaware of the party who has access to their per-
sonal information, what data is actually being utilized, how and when such utilization is 
taking place and finally on the entire 
 
7.5 Possible solutions to avoid data privacy rules in relation to sharing of personal 
data 
 
As has been demonstrated above, there is an inherent tension between the sharing of data 
from the procompetitive perspective and the protection of the privacy of personal data. There 
are however situations where the data might not fall under the provisions of the GDPR. The 
principles of data protection apply only to information concerning an identified or identifia-
ble natural person. The principles of data protection on the other hand do not apply to anon-
ymous information, which means information which does not relate to an identified or iden-
tifiable natural person or to personal data made anonymous so that the data subject can no 
longer be identified.278 Anonymisation can be used by companies to comply with the data 
protection obligations and also make it possible for companies to share information with the 
public. In general, it is easier to disclose anonymised data than personal data as there are less 
legal restrictions to this. It is also easier to use anonymised data in different ways as the data 
can be then used for different purposes.279 According to the Finnish Data Ombudsman, the 
anonymisation of personal data refers to the technical and other measures through which 
personal data is irrevocably altered into such a form that the data subject cannot be directly 
or indirectly identified from them by anyone. The anonymization is a form of processing of 
data. The processor has to evaluate the anonymity of the data at certain intervals even after 
the data has been anonymized. Even if the processor is of the view that the data is anony-
mized, it could happen that a third party is nonetheless able to identify the person by using 
techniques or otherwise process the data in a manner that enables the identification.280  
 
Not all measures aimed at making the personal data less identifiable amount to anonymiza-
tion. Pseudonymisation means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the 
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of addi-
tional information. However such additional information have to be kept separately and be 
                                                          
278 Recital 26 of the GDPR. 
279 Information Commissioner’s Office ‘’Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice’’. 
Available at <https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2018), p. 12.  
280 The Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman (2015). 
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subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not at-
tributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.281 Recital 26 of GDPR provides that 
in order to determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all 
the means reasonably likely to be used either by the controller or by another person to iden-
tify the person directly or indirectly. In order to define whether means are reasonably likely 
to be used to identify the person, factors such as the costs of and the amount of time required 
for identification should be considered, taking into consideration the available technology at 
the time of the processing and technological developments should be considered.  
 
However while anonymization might be useful in avoiding the applicability of the GDPR, it 
has other problems for companies. Namely as Stalla-Bourdillon and Knight point out, the 
fact that the value of datasets is maximized when patterns are discovered and linking rela-
tionships between data points and anonymization delinks relationships that can be discov-
ered about peoples’ identities. The question for companies surrounding anonymization is 
therefore, how can the companies embark on data anonymization and still retain the utility 
of the data for a future third party with whom the data is shared subsequently?282 In addition, 
there is the problem with defining the value of the data set to the competitor if it has been 
anonymized only after the court has ordered the sharing of said data. Where completely 
anonymized data is processed for business purposes and transferred between companies, 
then there are no foreseeable problems with the GDPR. In any case companies should not 
assume that by simply removing certain features of the data sets, the data would automati-
cally be rendered anonymous and thus outside the scope of the GDPR.  
 
7.5.1 The forced sharing of data under the GDPR in the form of data portability 
 
As has been discussed above, the GDPR offers an alternative approach to the sharing of user 
data (provided this data is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR), namely the data 
portability. Indeed data portability can prevent abuse of dominance and consumers from be-
ing locked into services. Also data portability could make it easier for consumers to benefit 
from value-added services from third parties and creating more access to the market for other 
companies.283 The EDPS is of the opinion that remedies should be subject to strict conditions 
                                                          
281 Article 4 of the GDPR. 
282 Stalla-Bourdillon – Knight (2016), p. 285. 
283 EDPS (2014) para. 83.  
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and safeguards following the principle of data minimization, which holds that only strictly 
necessary personal information should be processed. The EDPS has suggested that data port-
ability should be implemented by way of giving the users an opportunity to withdraw their 
personal information and to transfer it to another company, which would benefit the com-
petitive market structure.284 Data portability could release synergies between competition 
law and data protection law by preventing abuse of dominance and empower consumers to 
benefit from other companies’ services while making it easier for access to the market by 
competitors.285 However, Stucke and Grunes point out that data portability could reduce in-
centives for the companies forced to hand over their users’ data to conduct business. On the 
other hand, it should be borne in mind that the users’ ‘own’ their personal data.286  
 
The use of data portability is however limited as it applies only to situations where the pro-
cessing is based on consent or on a contract and the processing is carried out by automated 
means.287 Nonetheless the processing of personal data for the purposes of user data among 
companies seems to fit quite perfectly for the above requirements as the initial processing is 
often based on the user’s consent or on the contract (for instance contract for service or 
goods) between the user and the company. In addition the collection and analysis of big data 
in most cases require automated processing. It could be said then that there are no legal 
obstacles in the application of the data portability to the personal data processed as part of a 
data set of a company. 
 
Companies might be sanctioned under the GDPR if they refuse to allow their customers to 
port their data to another company.288 However, restrictions on data portability can probably 
only be justified by technical difficulties.289 Furthermore there seems to be consensus at the 
Commission level on the need to promote the sharing of data as the Commission is of the 
view that in order to facilitate exploitation and reduce transaction costs there should be less 
restrictions and more harmonised rules on data re-use.290 
 
                                                          
284 Ibid, para. 72.  
285 Ibid, para. 83.  
286 Stucke – Grunes (2016), p. 332. 
287 GDPR Art. 20 1(b).  
288 See article 83 of the GDPR for the setting of fines.  
289 Geradin – Kuschewsky (2013), p. 11.  
290 Communication from the Commission (2014), p. 5. 
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An interesting example of data portability related issues related to Google. In March 2013, 
the Commission formally informed Google of its preliminary conclusion291 that certain busi-
ness practices by Google may violate EU antitrust rules prohibiting the abuse of a dominant 
position. Among the concerns of the Commission were the contractual restrictions on the 
transferability of online search advertising campaigns to search advertising platforms main-
tained by Google’s rivals and the management of such campaigns across Google's Adwords 
and rival search advertising platforms. Vanberg and Bilal Ünver are of the opinion that the 
Google case demonstrates the importance of data portability in order to avoid consumer lock-
in in concentrated markets. They argue that Google has in its possession a vast amount of 
personal data allowing it to deliver relevant and high quality search results. Thus Google 
prevents other search engines from effectively competing with it by not sharing this data 
with its competitors.292  
 
Data portability has not been welcomed without criticism. Kallasvuo points out that the right 
to portability can be criticized for its ambiguous wording as the GDPR does not clarify the 
situations in which the portability is technically possible. Kallasvuo argues that the wording 
of the GPDR does not seem to require that the controller has to alter the data in such a form 
that allows the data subject to port his or her data to another system. On the other hand, 
Article 18 of the GDPR can also be interpreted as precluding the processor from willfully 
hindering the portability from one system to another. This view is supported by the fact that 
the processor is under a duty to facilitate the fulfilment of the data subjects’ rights under 
Article 12 paragraph 1a of the GDPR.293 
 
However, consumers need to be aware of other service providers in order to be able to port 
their data to them in the first place. The EDPS is of the view that when consumers are better 
informed, they should be more capable to choose between competing online services.294  It 
is thus clear that in order for the data portability to function properly, the principle of trans-
parency is of utmost importance.  It seems that not all of the consumers are aware of the 
GDPR and the related rights. For instance only 29% of the Finnish consumers had even 
                                                          
291 European Commission ‘’Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address com-
petition concerns’’.  2014, Available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-371_en.htm>  (accessed 
23 March 2018).  
292 Diker – Ünver (2017). 
293 Kallasvuo (2015), p. 154.  
294 EDPS (2014), para. 82.  
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heard of the GDPR. Of those who are aware of the GDPR, only 9% will use the right to 
access to their personal data. However the amount of consumers who will seek access to the 
personal data stored by social media services is 33%, which signals that consumers are more 
concerned about the data that social media companies store of them.295 
 
Users might be aware of the company to whom the users first gave their personal infor-
mation, however the users most likely are not aware of the subsequent recipient companies 
that process their information. Even if companies offered transparent information about the 
recipients of the personal data, it is questionable whether the users would in fact read these 
statements.  
 
As a result the data portability is dependent first on the users being informed, and second 
that the users actually understand where their personal data is being transferred. Finally the 
users have to actually be willing to request their data to be transferred.  
 
7.6 Concluding remarks on court ordered forced sharing and data portability 
 
Both the court ordered remedy under the essential facilities doctrine and the data portability 
under the GDPR result in the personal data of the user being transferred between the initial 
data processor (the dominant company for the purposes of this thesis). There are nonetheless 
various differences between these two measures. First of all the data portability applies to 
companies regardless of their size, whereas the forced sharing remedy is applicable to dom-
inant companies within the meaning of EU competition law. Another key difference is the 
fact that it is the user (data subject) who initiates the transfer of his or her data under the data 
portability right envisaged in the GDPR, whereas the competition law remedy of forced 
sharing is the result of a regulator or court based finding of an abuse of dominance and the 
users whose personal data is involved are not the parties to these proceedings albeit they 
certainly are an important stakeholder group. On the procedural side, the competition law 
remedy requires the finding of a dominant position which might be a lengthy process with 
both the regulator investigating and the parties appealing to the Courts. On the other hand 
the data portability right is a mere technical process albeit it has its implications on the com-
panies having to be able to carry out the transfer of the data in the required format.  
                                                          
295 Metsämäki (2017).  
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The court ordered sharing poses privacy concerns and requires careful analysis of the justi-
fications for the processing of personal data as has been described above. Data portability is 
only possible where the users truly wish to transfer their data to competitor, thus it means 
that the companies should seek to offer better services and products in order to have the 
consumer port their data to them. On the other hand there are various obstacles to data port-
ability, for instance the information problems associated with the lack of transparency of the 
data processing.  
 
Finally forced sharing ordered by the court and the data portability both contain unclear parts 
which raise legal certainty problems for companies. Both can also act to reduce the incen-
tives for companies to innovate and invest. However, it seems that for the data portability 
the case is not that strong as consumers in fact own their personal data and are free to make 
the decision on whom to transfer the data.  
 
Warma and Nieminen are of the opinion that transferring the data of each individual at a 
time is not a satisfactory solution from the view point of competition compared to the transfer 
of large data masses.296 Indeed this is a strong argument as the sharing of data based on data 
portability only concerns the data of a single individual and not a data set itself. Furthermore, 
the problems associated with data portability mentioned above limit the usability of data 
portability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
296 Warma – Nieminen (2016), p. 558.  
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8. Conclusions 
 
This thesis has analysed the implications arising from the accumulation of large datasets 
with personal information from the point of view of competition law and data privacy regu-
lations. The main question of this thesis was whether big data containing personal infor-
mation can be regarded as an essential facility under the competition law. As a result of the 
analysis, it can be concluded that big data as a non-tangible asset cannot be compared with 
traditional infrastructure such as power lines or railroads. Despite this fact, the accumulation 
of big data can in practice increase the market power and be used to exclude companies from 
the market.  
 
The essential facility doctrine focuses on the indispensability of the facility and whether the 
facility will be used to introduce a new product to the market or follow-on innovation. No 
clear conclusion can be made whether big data amounts to an indispensable facility without 
which companies could not compete. The reasons for this are multifold among them the fact 
that big data in most cases is non-rivalrous meaning that it is possible for companies to ac-
quire the same set of data from the users despite the fact that a company already possess that 
data. However, this is not always the case as some types of data can be rivalrous, such as 
data that goes out of date quickly or data that is highly personalized. As a result, regulators 
and courts should take a case-by-case approach. Furthermore it might not be feasible for 
companies to acquire a certain data set from third parties despite the fact that there are data 
brokers selling certain data to companies. Especially in consumer markets, the accumulation 
of data can cause a snowball effect with the dominant company being able to improve its 
services by the use of the user data and attract even more users as a result. For the new 
product requirement it is challenging for companies seeking access to data to demonstrate 
what they will in fact do with the data and what type of new product or innovation they will 
introduce instead of simply using the data to improve their marketing.  
 
On a more fundamental basis, compelling companies to share their data assets could reduce 
their incentives to innovate and invest and as a result the benefits of big data would not be 
realized. Indeed the role of competition law is not to assist inefficient market entrants wish-
ing to gain the assets of more efficient companies. Another harm arising from forced sharing 
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of big data concerns the administrability problem associated with the remedy of forced shar-
ing. Especially the problem of quantifying a fair remuneration and access terms to the data 
raise obstacles to the use of the access remedy.  
 
The structure of the market plays a crucial part in the analysis of whether big data can result 
in dominance and become an essential facility. This thesis has brought forward the idea that 
competition law should only intervene in situations where the data asset forms a genuine 
barrier to entry such as where there are network effects and locked in consumers or the data 
set is truly unique and cannot be copied under any circumstances. While this is no doubt 
challenging for the regulators and courts to do, it is no reason why it should not be done.  
 
In cases of traditional facilities such as railroads and powerlines, there are no other stake-
holders with their personal data being transferred as is the case with the sharing of big data 
containing the data of the users. While competition law regime is concerned with well-func-
tioning competition and consumer welfare, the aim of data privacy regulations including the 
GDPR is the protection of personal data. Forced sharing of data can thus serve the goals of 
competition law by enabling well-functioning competition but at the same time collide with 
data privacy regulations by making the personal data of the users’ subject to the processing 
by the recipient company without a legal basis contained in the GDPR. In some cases there 
can be a legal basis for the processing of the personal data by the recipient company for 
instance when the sharing is based on the court ordered remedy and on the broad interpreta-
tion of the legal basis of legal obligation. However even if there is a legal basis for the pro-
cessing of the information, the data subject should be informed of the sharing of the data 
according to the GDPR. In practice, this could turn out to be a heavy burden on companies 
and even impossible as companies cannot be aware of possible future requests to share data 
with competitors. Furthermore if the purpose for which the data was originally collected and 
processed changes, then consent should be acquired from the data subjects, which can be 
truly challenging.  
 
An alternative approach to the data sharing is the data portability right contained in the 
GDPR. This right allows for the data subjects to ask for the company to transfer the user’s 
personal data to a competitor under certain circumstances. However this right is only appli-
cable under limited circumstances, such as where the data is processed in order to fulfil a 
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contract between the data subject and the company. Besides this right differs from the com-
petition law remedy of forced sharing in that the data portability is dependent on the will and 
activity of the data subjects whereas the competition law remedy of forced sharing is de-
pendent on the ruling of the court or the decision of the regulator. The personal data of a 
single user is in addition not nearly as useful for companies as full data sets made available 
through forced sharing. As a result data portability can hardly be a useful tool in tackling 
disruptions in the competitive process.   
 
As a conclusion big data containing personal data can in some circumstances form an essen-
tial facility capable of being the subject of the court ordered forced sharing remedy. In theory 
data portability right has less concerns for the incentives of companies to innovate and invest 
in big data as the personal data belongs to the user and he or she has the right to decide what 
to do with the personal data. On the other hand the data sets subject to forced sharing could 
contain the data of multiple users and even other data than the mere user data, which makes 
this form of data more useful for companies.  
 
The key point is that while big data can result in market power and possible competitive 
disruptions, its benefits are in most cases short lived in the fast moving IT sector. Therefore 
there is a need for sector specific regulation that takes into consideration both the efficient 
functioning of markets as well as the data privacy aspects.  
 
 
 
 
